Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Harry Kirk Creamer v. The Ogden Union Railway
and Depot Company : Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Bryan P. Leverich. M. J. Bronson; A. U. Miner; Howard F. Coray; D. A. Alsup; Counsel for
Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Creamer v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co., No. 7664 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1457

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the

flreme Com1 of the State of Utah
:HARRY KIRK CREAMER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
1:.TBE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY ·
. AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corpor- _
··iJtion,

.case No.
7664

Defe;ndant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF
,,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,

;F I L ~:rt~~:~?N,
q~D

F. CORAY,

JAN 11 i991 A. ALSUP,

·

Counsel for

-l"a;k::-s~~;;;;c~-;;;;~·ut~fe'nciant and Appellant
10 South Main Street
Salt La~e City, Utah
ARROW PRIM• 8ALT LAK.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
POINT I. THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS
NOT ATTEMPTED TO SECURE A REVERSAL
OF THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE FOR EXCESSIVENESS OF THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
ERROR CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION NO.
15 DID NOT PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT

3

POINT II. THE FACT THAT THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES HAS HELD THAT
CLOSE AND DOUBTFUL CASES UNDER THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY FOR
DETERMINATION IF THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR A VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT
THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A JURY FOR DETERMINATION

5

POINT III. THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR
PRESENTED NO QUESTION FOR SUBMISSION TO A JURY ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE, WHETHER THE
SUBJECT BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT TOWARD THE
PLAINTIFF OR TOWARD A CLASS OF WHICH
THE PLAINTIFF WAS A MEMBER

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
CASES CITED

Bennett v. Pilot Products Company,
P. 2d 525 ................. .

Utah
, 235
....... 14, 15

Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
. , 218 P. 2d 1080

Utah
4

Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 335 U. S. 329, 69 S.
Ct. 91, 93 L. Ed. 41

6

Moore, Administrator v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.,
340 U. S. 573, 71 S. Ct. 428, 95 L. Ed. 294

6

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, 248 N.
Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253
... 10, 13
Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123

4

Raymond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 113 Utah
26, 191 P. 2d 137 . . . . . .
..............

6

Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 335 U. S. 852,
69 S. Ct. 80, 93 L. Ed. 400 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

TEXTS CITED

Harper on Torts, Section 145 ........ .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HARRY KIRK CREAMER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
7664

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Respondent's brief presents certain arguments which
are so basically erroneous that they should not pass unchallenged :
( 1) Respondent, hereinafter referred to as the plain..
tiff, argues by his brief that the defendant was negligent as
to a class of which the plaintiff was a member, and consequently, was negligent as to the plaintiff (Respondent's
Brief 22, et seq.) .
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(2) The plaintiff argues that this case should have
been submitted to a jury because jury trial is "a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence and is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Federal Employers' Liability Act"
(Respondent's Brief 41, et seq.).
( 3) The plaintiff argues that Instruction No. 15, if
erroneous, does not constitute prejudicial error because the
defendant makes no claim that the damages awarded were
excessive (Respondent's Brief 47, 49).
Answering these three arguments in their inverse order,
the defendant asserts :
( 1) The fact that the defendant has not attempted
to secure a reversal of the judgment in this case for excessiveness of the damages awarded to the plaintiff does
not support plaintiff's argument that the error contained
in Instruction No. 15 did not prejudice the defendant.
(2) The fact that the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that close and doubtful cases under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act should be submitted to
a jury for determination if there is an evidentiary basis
for a verdict in favor of the plaintiff does not support the
plaintiff's argument that this case should have been submitted to a jury for determination.
(3) The evidence in the case at bar presented no
question for submission to a jury on the issue of the defendant's negligence, whether the subject be viewed in the
light of the defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff or
toward a class of which the plaintiff was a member.
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POINT I.
THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS
NOT ATTEMPTED TO SECURE A REVERSAL
OF THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE FOR EXCESSIVENESS OF THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
ERROR CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION NO.
15 DID NOT PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT.
At pages 46 and 47 of his brief the plaintiff states:
"Instruction No. 15 is a correct statement of the law and
did not result in any prejudice to defendant especially
where it appears that defendant makes no claim that the
damages awarded were excessive." We do not propose to
restate here the bases of our contention that Instruction
No. 15 is argumentative. We think that it is argumentative
and we have heretofore pointed out the reasons for this
belief in our original brief. We do propose, however, to
answer briefly the statement of plaintiff's counsel that
said instruction, even if argumentative, was not prejudicial
to the defendant.
That statement is patently erroneous for the following reasons :
(a) If, as we contend, Instruction No. 15 argues for
the plaintiff that he should recover some verdict whether
the defendant was negligent or otherwise, it is obvious
that the instruction might have affected not only the size
of the verdict, but also might have influenced the determination by the jury that the plaintiff should prevail at all.
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To assert that an instruction which is in argumentative
form in favor of the plaintiff on the subject of liability
is not prejudicial to the defendant because the amount of
the verdict is not excessive, when such instruction may
have influenced the outcome of the case in so far as liability is concerned, is indeed an illogical statement.
(b) In a suit for personal injuries there is no method
of determining the plaintiff's damages with mathematical
precision. Reasonable jurors may and do differ as to the
amount which should be awarded. Accordingly, the courts
have deliberately limited their own supervision of the
size of verdicts in such cases. If the amount awarded falls
between the minimum figure which reason will support and
the maximum figure which reasonable jurors would
award, then the courts refuse to substitute their own judgment for that of the jurors. Duffy v. Union Pacific RailUtah
218 P. 2d 1080. As said by
road Company
Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Pauly v. McCarthy, 109
Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123:
0

0

0

0

0

0,

"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing
damages for personal injuries."
Since the minimum and the maximum amounts between which a verdict will be permited to stand by the
courts of this state may well be thousands of dollars apart,
it is obviously of considerable monetary consequence to
the parties where between those limits the jury fixes the
damages. It would therefore seem to follow inescapably
that an argumentative instruction which induces a jury to
place the damages in the upper strata between such reason-
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able maximum and minimum limits, as opposed to the
lower strata between the same limits, has materially prejudiced the defendant. Consequently, the failure of the
defendant to challenge the verdict in the case at bar for
excessiveness as being above the maximum limit which the
courts would approve affords no basis whatever for plaintiff's conclusion that no prejudice has resulted from an
argumentative damage instruction such ·as Instruction
No. 15.
POINT II.
THE FACT THAT THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES HAS HELD THAT
CLOSE AND DOUBTFUL CASES UNDER THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY FOR
DETERMINATION IF THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR A VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT
THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A JURY FOR DETERMINATION.
Plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court of the
United States has ruled that close or doubtful cases under
the F. E. L.A. should be submitted to juries for determination and that jury trial is a part of the right of plaintiffs
under this act. But these platitudes furnish no assistance
in deciding the issue in the case at bar. Equally well settled
and supported by authority are the fundamental propositions that (a) in the absence of evidence of negligence on
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the part of the defendant the trial court should not submit a case to a jury for determination, and (b) the jury
should be properly instructed as to the law which may
require a judgment for defendant.
Mr. Justice Wolfe expressed these views in language
which we cannot improve, as follows :
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff
that this decision has deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial. That contention has been
urged upon this court in almost every case of nonsuit and directed verdict brought before us. This
court is charged with the duty of protecting all of
the rights of all litigants. This is especially true of
those fundamental rights guaranteed by the State
and Federal Constitutions. But the right to have a
jury pass upon issues of fact does not include the
right to have a cause submitted to a jury in the hope
of a verdict where the facts undisputably show that
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Raymond v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.
2d 137.
The Supreme Court of the United· States has recognized that there are cases under the F. E. L. A. which are
non-liability cases as a matter of law.

Moore, Administrator v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.
Co., 340 U. S. 573, 71 S. Ct. 428, 95 L. Ed.
294;
Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 335 U. S. 329,
69 S. Ct. 91, 93 L. Ed. 41;
Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 335 U.
S. 852, 69 S. Ct. 80, 93 L. Ed. 400.
In that portion of his brief designated as Point II
plaintiff cites nine cases decided by the Supreme Court of
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the United States on facts which have no faint resemblance
to the facts in the case at bar. Why the decisions of that
court on different facts have the "controlling effect" mentioned at page 46 of plaintiff's brief is not said. Certainly
these cases do not stand for the proposition that all F. E.
L. A. cases should be decided by juries.
We respectfully submit that there is nothing close or
doubtful about the alleged negligence of the defendant in
the case at bar. There is an absolute void in so far as any
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant contributing to plaintiff's injuries is concerned. Plaintiff's
argument that the Creamer case should have been submitted
to a jury because the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that other cases totally dissimilar on the facts
should be submitted to a jury is unwarranted.

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR PRESENTED NO QUESTION FOR SUBMISSION
TO A JURY ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFENDENT'S NEGLIGENCE, WHETHER THE SUBJECT BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT TOWARD THE
PLAINTIFF OR TOWARD A CLASS OF WHICH
THE PLAINTIFF WAS A MEMBER.
Despite the camouflage injected by plaintiff's brief,
the issue to be determined in deciding whether or not this
case should have been submitted to a jury cannot be obscured. The issue to be determined may be stated concretely
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as follows: Is it negligent for an employer to require an
apparently healthy young man to perform hard work without machinery to eliminate the labor.
The plaintiff argues that the method of icing passenger
diners used by the defendant company in its operation at
Ogden constitutes negligence to a class, i.e., coach cleaners;
that plaintiff was a member of this class, and consequently,
that the defendant was negligent as to this plaintiff. This
is indeed a specious argument. We concede that the defendant owes to each and every -one of its employes the
duty of exercising :reasonable care under all circumstances.
However, the fact that the standard of care required by the
law is a constant, denominated reasonable care, does not
even remotely support the proposition that the quantum of
care required of the defendant to each of such employes is
likewise constant. One of the circumstances which determines what amount of care is reasonable care is the
known characteristics of a person to be affected by the defendant's conduct. As stated in Harper on Torts, Section

145:
"Since the matter of the plaintiff's incapacity
as bearing upon his duty to exercise care for his own
safety is closely connected, in the actual cases, with
the defendant's duty to use due care, mention should
be made here of the latter problem. As to the repair
of premises or conditions of streets, a defendant owes
no greater duty toward persons possessed of physical
infirmities than toward others. But if the plaintiff's
infirmity or affliction is known to the defendant, the
standard· of the reasonable man will require him to
adjust his affirmative conduct with reference to
such person's infirmities, and he may be guilty of
negligence for actions which the ordinary prudent
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person would avoid with respect to them. The known
incapacity of the plaintiff becomes one of the 'facts
and circumstances of the case.' and the extent of the
defendant's duty must be measured accordingly. The
degree of care required is the same-the care of
the ordinary reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances. But this degree of care obviously requires different conduct toward children, the
sick, lame, blind, insane or intoxicated, when such
incapacity is known, from that required toward
adult persons of sound limb, faculty and mind. 'A
sick or aged person, a delicate woman, a lame man,
or a child is entitled to more attention * * *
from a railroad company than one in good· health
and under no disability. They are entitled to more
time in which to get on or off the cars; they are
entitled to more consideration when crossing a street,
to the end that the cars shall not run over them.'
The point was further brought out in a Texas case in
which landlord, with knowledge of the plaintiff's
pregnancy, entered the leased premises and in the
presence of the plaintiff made an assault upon some
negroes which so frightened her that a miscarriage
resulted. The defendant was held responsible. Since
the defendant knew of the plaintiff's disability, he
should have foreseen some such harm, and he is
therefore negligent. Since the risk of the particular
harm was one of the very factors which made his
conduct negligent, there is, of course, no difficulty
with the problem of legal causation. If the plaintiff's incapacity or disability was unknown to the
defendant, the reasonableness of the latter's conduct
must be determined without reference thereto."

a

The facts and circumstances of the case at bar as disclosed by the evidence were that the plaintiff was an apparently healthy, normal young man, about 36 years of age.
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He was over six feet tall and weighed in excess of 200
pounds, with at least normal muscular development. Even
if it could be said (which we deny under the facts in this
case) that the defendant company would have been negligent had it assigned an aged or weak person, or an individual
known to be otherwise handicapped, to Creamer's task, this
cannot help the plaintiff, who possessed no such known
handicaps.
Mr. Justice Cardozo discussed the concept of negligence
and the principles involved in the case of Palsgraf v. ~ong
Island Railroad Company, 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59
A. L. R. 1253, at considerable length. He was applying the
principles to a different fact situation but his analysis is
equally cogent here. In that case a train of the defendant
stopped at a station where the plaintiff, a woman, was standing on the platform waiting for a second train. Two men
ran forward. to catch the train which had stopped. The
second man, who was carrying a package, jumped aboard
the car but seemed about to fall. A guard employed by the
defendant reached forward to help him and another guard
on the platform pushed him from behind. During this
activity the package was dislodged and fell upon the rails.
The package, which was about 15 inches long, covered by
newspaper, contained fireworks, although there was nothing
in its appearance to give notice of its contents. The fireworks exploded when they fell and the resultant shock threw
down some scales at the other end of the platform which
struck the plaintiff. In determining that the defendant was
not liable to the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Cardozo made the
following remarks:
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"If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at
least to outward seeming, with reference to her, did
not take to itself the quality of a tort because it
happened to be a wrong, though apparently not one
involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to some one else. 'In every instance, before
negligence can be predicated of a given act, back
of the act must be sought and found a duty to the
individual complaining, the observance of which duty
would have averted or avoided the injury.' (Citing
cases) 'The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative.' (Citing cases) The plaintiff sues in
her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not
as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to
another.

* * * * *

"The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong
at all, has a cause of action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be protected against
invasion of his bodily security is neither greater nor
less because the act resulting in the invasion is a
wrong to another far removed. In this case, the
rights that are said to have been violated, the interests said to have been invaded, are not even of the
same order. The man was not injured in his person
nor even put in danger. The purpose of the act, as
well as its effect, was to make his person safe. If
there was a wrong to him at all, which may very well
be doubted it was a wrong to a property interest only,
the safety of his package. Out of this wrong to
property, which threatened injury to nothing else,
there ·has passed, we are told, to the plaintiff by
derivation or succession a right of action for the
invasion of an interest of another order, the right to
bodily security. The diversity of interests emphasizes
the futility of the effort to build the plaintiff's right
upon the basis of a wrong to some one else. The gain
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is one of emphasis, for a like result would follow if
the interests were the same. Even then, the orbit of
the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty. One who jostles
one's neighbor in a crowd does not invade the rights
of others standing at the outer fringe when the unintended contact casts a bomb upon the ground. The
wrongdoer as to them is the man who carries the
bomb, not the one who explodes it without suspicion
of the danger. Life will have to be made over, and
human nature transformed, before previsions so extravagant can be accepted as the norm of conduct,
the customary standard to which behavior must conform.
"The argument for the plaintiff is built upon
the shifting meanings of such words as 'wrong' and
'wrongful,' and shares their instability. What the
plaintiff must show is 'a wrong' to herself, i.e., a
violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong
to someone else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but not 'a wrong' to anyone. We are told
that one who drives at reckless speed through a
crowded city street is guilty of a negligent act, and
therefore of a wrongful one, irrespective of the consequences. Negligent the act is, and wrongful in
the sense that it is unsocial, but wrongful and unsocial in relation to other travelers only because the
eye of vigilanceperceives the risk of damage. If the
same act were to be committed on a speedway or a
race course, it would lose its wrongful quality. The
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to
another or to others within the range of apprehension."
In the Palsgraf case the defendant company owed the
duty of reasonable care to all of its passengers, of which
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class the plaintiff was certainly a member. But conduct
which may perhaps have been negligent as to the man with
the package \vas not negligent as to the plaintiff.
On similar principles, even if it may be said that the
method used by the Depot Company for icing diners was
negligent as to other coach cleaners, it is improper to permit the plaintiff to rely upon such a theory to recover for
himself. In the absence of knowledge of his impaired health
or any circumstances from which it may be inferred that
the defendant should have known of Creamer's impaired
health, there was no reason for the defendant company to
perceive danger in assigning this man to the task to be
undertaken. If it were a fact that the Depot Company
customarily used hoisting machinery in icing diners when
employes other than Creamer performed similar work, still
there would have been no negligence on the part of the Depot
Company in requiring Creamer to perform the task without
machinery, unless danger was reasonably to be perceived in
requiring him so to undertake the task.
It may be interesting to note the opening sentence of

the annotation in A. L. R. following the Palsgraf case, supra.
The annotator there states :
"The position taken in the majority opinion in
the reported case that the basis of an action for
negligence must be a violation of plaintiff's own
right, and not merely a wrong to someone else, is
elementary."
In addition to the fallacy in plaintiff's argument pointed out above, there is a second equally conclusive reason for
rejecting the plaintiff's argument. Even if it be assumed
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that Creamer may rely upon negligence of the defendant
toward other coach cleaners as a basis for recovering damages for loss sustained by him, his position would still be
hopeless because there is no evidence of negligence as to the
class to which he belonged.
There is no evidence in the record which even tends to
indicate that the defendant assigned any employe to the
work of icing diners under such circumstances that the defendant knew, or should have known that said employe had
impaired health which rendered the work dangerous.
In any event, the duty to use reasonable care toward
the members of a class requires only that amount of care
which would be reasonable as to a normal member of such
class, unless there is knowledge that one or more of the
members of that class are in fact abnormal. This was clearly established by this court in the case of Bennett v. Pilot
Products Company,
Utah ... , 235 P. 2d 525. In that
case the plaintiff had used a permanent wave lotion distributed by the defendant. She developed a dermatitis, for which
damages were sought on the theory that the defendant was
negligent in failing to warn her that the lotion would produce the dermatitis. The evidence disclosed that the lotion
was harmless to a normal person but that it had produced
the dermatitis of the plaintiff because she was allergic to a
mixture of two ingredients contained in the lotion. In holding that the plaintiff had failed to make a jury question on
the issue of the defendant's negligence, Mr. Justice Henroid
speaking for the court said :
"We are sympathetic with appellant and her misfortune, but cannot requre the merchant to assume
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the role of absolute insurer against physiological
idiosyncracy. To do so also would invest the elusive
ordinary prudent man with a quality of foreseeability
that would take him out of character completely.
Every substance, including food which is daily consumed by the public, occasionally becomes anathema
to him peculiarly allergic to it. To require insurability against such an unforeseeable happenstance would
weaken the structure of common sense, as well as
present an unreasonable burden on the channels of
trade."
The court considered the duty to foresee injury as the
result of the personal idiosyncracies of the user of the product and held as follows :
"Counsel for appellant very ably urged that
there was sufficient evidence to reach the jury on
the question of negligence. Examination of the
authorities requires that we differ, and in doing so
we believe that there was no evidence to go to the
jury on the question of the reasonable foreseeability
of danger and harm to the normal person contemplated by the law. * * * So far as they (certain
cases to the contrary) sanction recovery by an unanticipated few whose sensitivities or allergies are
not reasonably foreseeable, we cannot accept them.
Rather we must adhere to the philosophy enunciated
by the cases reflected in respondent's citations and
which was put so aptly by Dean Prosser in his work
on Torts, p. 679, to the effect that: 'The manufacturer
is at least entitled to assume that the chattel will be
put to a normal use by a normal user, and is not
subject to liability where it would ordinarily be safe,
but injury results from some unusual use or some
personal idiosyncracy of the user."
If a merchant whose products are distributed to the

public at large is not to be required to foresee injury as a
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result of the personal sensitivities of his potential customers,
then how can an employer be expected to exercise a greater
foresight concerning his employes, who are examined by
competent physicians as a part of their employment. We
respectfully submit that negligence is the basis of liability
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and that the
plaintiff Creamer cannot recover from the defendant in
this case. If this verdict is permitted to stand, then any
employer may be held negligent if he fails to foresee danger
in honest toil. Such a result offends the basic principles
of the economic system of this nation.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,
Counsel for
Defendant and Appellant

10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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